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I. INTRODUCTION
Miguel Angel Ekmekdjian, a legal scholar' outraged by the
1. Ekmekdjian has written extensively on Argentine constitutional law. See, e.g.,
MIGUEL ANGEL EKMEKDIAN, ANALYSIS PEDAG6GICO DE LA CONSTITUCI6N NACIONAL (2d ed.
1988); Miguel Angel Ekmekdjian, Los casos "Birt" y "Sanchez Abelenda,'" a prop6sito de la
integracibn humanitaria latinoamerica, 1990-B REVISTA JURIDICA ARGENTINA-LA LEY
[L.L.] 1024; Miguel Angel Ekmekdjian, El derecho a la dignidad y la libertad de prensa,
1986-C L.L. 981; Miguel Angel Ekmekdjian, Derecho a la informacion, 1985-E L.L. 699.
Also, he has sued unsuccessfully to enforce the right of reply in the Argentine Supreme
Court. See Judgment of Dec. 1, 1988 (Ekmkedjian v. Neustadt), Corte Suprema de Justicia
de la Naci6n [CSJN], 311 Fallos 2497 (Arg.).
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broadcast of offensive phrases2 about the relationship between
Jesus Christ and the Virgin Mary, filed suit in an Argentine civil
court to enforce his right of reply contained in article 14 of the
American Convention on Human Rights.' After the trial and ap-
pellate courts denied him relief, Ekmekdjian filed for extraordi-
nary relief in the Argentine Supreme Court.4 He argued that Ar-
gentina's ratification of the American Convention on Human
Rights and the language of article 14 created a self-executing right
of reply within Argentina.' The Argentine Supreme Court re-
versed,' holding that persons whose fundamental beliefs have been
offended by the media have the right to reply.7 Judgment of July
7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich), Corte Suprema de Justicia de la
Naci6n [CSJN], - Fallos - (Arg.).
This Case Comment begins with a description of the current
conditions of the Argentine political climate, press, and judiciary.
Within this context, the Case Comment analyzes the case of
Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich. The Case Comment argues that, while
the Argentine Supreme Court incorporated a provision of a human
rights treaty into national law and possibly signalled an aggressive
approach to implementing such treaties, analysis of the current Ar-
gentine political climate, the Argentine judicial system, and the
opinion of Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich reveals a Court unlikely to as-
sume the role of a human rights implementer.
2. The Court never quoted the offensive phrases, probably because Ekmekdjian did not
state them in his complaint. Ekmekdjian protested the "expression of a series of offensive
phrases that respect and good taste prevent me from repeating, about the relationship of
Jesus Christ and the Virgin Mary .... " Judgment of July 7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich),
CSJN, - Fallos -, para. 1 (Petracchi and O'Conner, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (Arg.) (author's translation). In Spanish: "se expresb con una serie de frases agravi-
antes que el respeto y el buen gusto me impiden repetir, en relacibn a Nuestro Senlor
Jesucristo y a su Santisima Madre .... "
3. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 14, O.A.S. Treaty Series
No. 36, OEA/ser. L/V/II.23 doc. rev.2 entered into force July 18, 1978 [hereinafter American
Convention]; Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich, para. 2 (majority opinion). Article 14(1) of the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights provides that "[alnyone injured by inaccurate or offen-
sive statements or ideas disseminated to the public in general by a legally regulated medium
of communication has the right to reply or to make a correction using the same communica-
tion's outlet, under such conditions as the law may establish." American Convention, supra,
art. 14(1).
4. Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich, para. 1 (majority opinion).
5. Id. at para. 2.
6. Id. at para. 32.
7. Id. at paras. 23, 27. The Court not only held article 14 to be self-executing, but also
adopted an extraordinarily broad view of standing. Id. at paras. 24-26. For a discussion of
the Court's opinion on standing see infra text accompanying notes 97-115.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Political Climate
Argentina elected Carlos Saul Menem as President on May 14,
1989." While Argentina's collapsing economy was his first priority, 9
Menem's inaugural address hinted that he would pardon convicted
human rights violators.'0 Prosecutors, judges, and Supreme Court
Justices appointed by his predecessor, President Alfonsin, had
joined in jailing those responsible for earlier violations of human
rights.1 Menem not merely pardoned the violators,'12 but systemat-
ically ousted the prosecutors, judges, and justices who had con-
fronted them. 3
On September 15, 1989, President Menem began a campaign
to pack the Argentine Supreme Court by asking Congress to ex-
pand the Court from five to nine Justices. 4 The bill passed both
Houses of Congress and became law on April 5, 1990.15 One com-
mentator reported, "[i]n 1990, [Menem] essentially put the Argen-
tine Supreme Court in his pocket when he packed it with new ap-
pointees loyal to him. He sneaked this measure through the
Congress one night by using busboys and clerks to fill the seats for
a quorum."'16
8. Shirley Christian, Peronist is Victor by a Wide Margin in Argentine Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 1989, at Al. Menem, scheduled to take office in December of 1989, replaced
President Alfonsin in July of 1989 upon Alfonsin's resignation. James F. Smith, Argentina's
Alfonsin Hands over the Reins to Menem, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 1989, at 6.
9. Smith, supra note 8, at 6; Christian, supra note 8, at A9.
10. Smith, supra note 8, at 6.
11. Aryeh Neier, Menem's Pardons and Purges, N.Y. TIsS, Oct. 2, 1989, at A19.
12. Eric Ehrmann, Carlos Menem Blinks, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 11, 1991, at 18;
see also 200 Military Officers are Pardoned in Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1989, at A12.
13. Ehrmann, supra note 12, at 18; see also Alfonsln, in/ra note 16, at 50. One commen-
tator reported that "protesters were especially angered by the President's attempt to purge
the Federal judiciary of zealous human-rights defenders appointed by Alfonsin." Arthur M.
Shapiro, Menem's Dangerous Maneuvers; Revising Peronism; Carlos Saul Menem, NEw
LEADER, Nov. 13, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newldr File. Menem also forced
resignations of the Solicitor General and the Buenos Aires District Attorney, while pressur-
ing several Supreme Court Justices to leave. Id.
14. Jose Licinio Scelzi, La Acordada 44 y la independencia del Poder Judicial, 1991-C
L.L. 741, 741.
15. Ley 23.774, 50-B ANALES DE LEGISLACI 6N ARGENTINA [A.D.L.A.] 1256-57 (1990); see
also, Cesar Domingo Yafiez, La nueva Corte Suprema de Justicia de ta Nacin. Ley 23.774,
1990-C L.L. 841. For a constitutional analysis see, Ival Rocca & Rodolfo B. Rotman, Jueces
de la Corte, 1989-E L.L. 1244.
16. Horacio Verbitsky, Argentina Retreats from Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1992,
at A23; see also RaWl Ricardo Alfonsin, The Function of Judicial Power During the Transi-
tion, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 41 (Irwin
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The current Court's nine Justices include only three appointed
prior to 1990.1" Former President Alfonsin has responded that
"[t]he present government, opting for immediate gains rather than
long-term progress, saw fit to alter summarily the number of Su-
preme Court judges, and at the same time explicitly mandate that
the Judiciary mirror its political goals." ' Indeed, the goals of the
executive and judicial branches, since 1990, have seemed danger-
ously inter-twined.
In the first major case following Menem's election, the new
Supreme Court deliberated 15 minutes before vacating a lower
court's injunction that froze Menem's proposed sale of the national
airline.19 In another case, the Supreme Court reversed a lower
court's judgment that had dismissed Menem's libel suit against a
reporter, ruling that Menem could proceed with the suit.20 One
commentator reports, "[a]t one time or another, most of the six
[Justices appointed by Menem] have been spotted by local report-
ers emerging from furtive meetings with the president."2
Menem continues to obstruct the formation of an independent
judiciary. On September 8, 1992, he fired his justice minister, who
P. Stotzky ed., forthcoming 1993), in which Alfonsin states that, "[slince the present govern-
ment's summary increase in the number of Supreme Court judges, it has consolidated an
unwavering majority of the Court, influenced other judges, pressured magistrates to force
their resignation, and removed officials, including those appointed with the Senate's con-
sent." Id. at 50.
17. See JONATHAN M. MIL.ER, ET AL., CONSTITUCJ6N Y DERECHOs HUMANOS 1797 (1991).
Menem appointed six new Justices in 1990, four after the Court's expansion and two from
vacancies created by retirement. Id. at 1797.
18. Alfonsin, supra note 16, at 49. Arguably, the conservative Reagan and Bush admin-
istrations packed the United States Supreme Court, since "there is now a very conservative
Court that reaches consistently conservative decisions." Erwin Chemeriniky, Forward: The
Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARy. L. Rav. 43, 45 (1989). The difference between the pack-
ing of the two Supreme Courts is simply one of time. Menem decreed an immediate change,
while Reagan and Bush gradually replaced the Justices. Note also that Menem's sweeping
economic reforms, combined with a court-packing plan, parallel American history during the
Great Depression when President Roosevelt introduced his New Deal legislation with a pro-
posed court-packing plan. For a discussion of Roosevelt's plan see William E. Leuchtenburg,
The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing" Plan, 1966 Sup. CT. Rav. 347.
19. Peter Ford, Menem Uses Court to Sell State Airline, THE INDEP., July 18, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Indpnt File. Ford reports that, "[o]f the five signatories
of the controversial judgment, four were newly appointed judges. Among them was Rodolfo
Barra, who drew particular fire because ... he helped to draft the very tender document
whose legality he was called upon to judge last week." Id.
20. In the Americas, MiAMI HERALD, Jan. 7, 1992, at A10; Argentine President's Libel
Suit Dismissed, CH. TRm., May 28, 1991, at C17.
21. Carl Honore, Argentine High Court's Prestige Tattered by Scandals, MiAMi HER-
ALD, Oct. 11, 1993, at A9.
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had objected to Menem's interference with the appointment of 235
new judges.2
B. The Argentine Press
Menem has recently complemented his attack on the judiciary
with an assault on the press. The Argentine press had raised his ire
by implicating his cabinet, his advisors, and members of his family
in government corruption. 23 President Menem's spokesperson in-
sisted, " '[t]he press [could] criticize the president, and he [was]
totally prepared to defend freedom of the press .. . ."24
Yet, rather than defend freedom of the press, President
Menem has responded by creating obstacles and promoting ani-
mosity. Beyond calling reporters journalistic delinquents,"' he has
withdrawn government advertising (which comprised 25% of one
newspaper's revenues) 2 and sued nearly one hundred journalists
for publishing unflattering information about officials2 7 Recently,
unidentified assailants attacked several reporters covering a
Menem speech.28 While beating another reporter, assailants ad-
vised the victim to stop reporting that government officials were
hiring thugs.28 A commentator remarked, "[t]hough no one is ac-
cusing the Menem Government of orchestrating the attacks, it is
being blamed for creating an environment hostile to the press.' o
Menem's antagonism toward the press sharply contrasts with
several articles of the Argentine Constitution that protect freedom
22. John Barham, Argentine Justice Minister Dismissed: Hopes for Independent Legal
System Set Back, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1992, at 5.
23. Ian Katz, Argentine Press Gaining Vigor, MIAMI HERALD, May 7, 1992, at A24;
Verbitsky, supra note 16, at A23.
24. Katz, supra note 23, at A24.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Verbitsky, supra note 16, at A23; see also Katz, supra 23, at A24.
28. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Reporters Facing Peril in Argentina, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 1,
1993, at A7; Start of a 'Dirty War?, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 17, 1993, at A22.
29. Nash, supra note 28; see also, Carl Honore, Assaults on Argentine Journalists Rise
as Vote Nears, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 23, 1993, at A6 (reporting that polls show that three
out of four of all Argentines believe Menem's Peronist party is behind a scare campaign).
30. Nash, supra note 28. Actually, a local television crew filmed one of the assailants
embracing Menem at an official ceremony. Id.; see also Free Markets, but What about Free
Speech-Charges of Ideological Persecution Persist, in COHA'S WASHINGTON REPORT ON
THE HEMISPHERE, Sept. 3, 1993, at 5 [hereinafter Free Markets] (reporting that Argentina's
press union charged authorities with deliberately ignoring death threats against a journalist
and implicated government officials in 38% of all aggressive acts committed against journal-
ists since 1990).
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
of the press."1 The Argentine Supreme Court has announced that,
"among the liberties preserved by the national constitution, ...
freedom of the press is one of those that possesses the most impor-
tance; without its appropriate regard there would exist merely a
purely nominal or deteriorating democracy. '"32
C. The Argentine Legal Structure
To examine the confines in which the Argentine Supreme
Court must act as an implementer of human rights, this note
presents a brief synopsis of the Argentine legal structure.3 "
The Argentine Constitution of 1853 is modeled after the
United States Constitution." It provides for executive, legislative,
and judicial branches which have powers similar to their United
States counterparts.3 5 The President negotiates and signs treaties"6
which Congress ratifies by passing a law approving the treaty."
Treaties, along with the Constitution and laws passed by Congress,
are the supreme law of the land under the Argentine
Constitution."s
The Argentine federal judiciary is also modeled after the
United States' federal system.3 9 Argentine federal court structure
and jurisdiction are similar to the format created by Article III of
31. Article 32 of the Argentine Constitution states that "[tihe Federal Congress shall
not pass any laws that restrict the liberty of the press or that establish federal jurisdiction
over it." CONST. AaG. art. 32. Article 14 states, in part, that "[all inhabitants of the Nation
enjoy the . . .right[ ] . . .of publishing their ideas through the press without previous
censorship .... Id. art. 14.
32. Judgment of July 7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich), CSJN, __ Fallos -, para. 6
(majority opinion) (Arg.) (citing 248 Fallos 291 (Arg.)) (author's translation). In Spanish:
"En tal sentido, esta Corte ha dicho que entre las libertades que la Constituci6n Nacional
consagra, la de la prensa es una de las que poseen mayor entidad, al extremo de que sin su
debido resguardo existiria tan solo una democracia desmedrado 6 puramente nominal."
33. For an in depth analysis see, Alberto F. Garay, Federalism, The Judiciary, and
Constitutional Adjudication in Argentina: A Comparison with the U.S. Constitutional
Model, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 161 (1991). See generally GERMAN J. BDART CAMPOS,
TRATADO ELEMENTAL DE DERECHO CONSTITUcIONAL ARCENTINO (1989); MIGuF ANGEL
EKMEKDJIAN, ANALYSIS PEDAG6GICO DE LA CONSTITUCI6N NACIONAL (2d ed. 1988).
34. Garay, supra note 33, at 162.
35. CONsT. ARG. arts. 36-73 (legislative powers), arts. 74-93 (executive powers), arts. 100-
03 (judicial powers).
36. Id. art. 86, § 14.
37. Id. art. 67, § 19.
38. Id. art. 31.
39. Garay, supra note 33, at 172-201.
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the United States Constitution.4 ' Last, like the United States Su-
preme Court, the Argentine Supreme Court has declared itself the
final interpreter of the Constitution.
4 1
However, Argentina has not absorbed all of the United States'
legal tradition. This is because the Spanish civil law influence has
hindered adoption of a strict principle of stare decisis.42 Civil law
countries follow the doctrine of jurisprudencia in which prior deci-
sions are considered persuasive, rather than binding, authority.43
That does not mean that prior decisions are of no importance. The
doctrine of jurisprudencia recognizes the stability of treating a
line of analogous cases similarly so that, "[a]s a general principle,
once the Argentine Supreme Court has decided a case, both its
holding and its ratio decidendi should be applied to subsequent
cases."44 The Argentine Supreme Court has referred explicitly to
40. Article 94 of the Argentine Constitution provides that "[tlhe Judicial Power of the
Nation shall be vested in a Supreme Court of Justice and in such lower courts as the Con-
gress may establish in the territory of the nation." CONST. ARG. art. 94. Article 100 of the
Argentine Constitution is also similar to Article III of the United States Constitution. It
provides that:
The Supreme Court of Justice and the lower courts of the Nation have jurisdic-
tion over and decide all cases dealing with matters governed by the Constitution
and the laws of the Nation, . . .and by treaties with foreign nations; all suits
concerning ambassadors, public ministers, and foreign consuls; of cases in admi-
ralty and maritime jurisdiction; of suits in which the Nation is a party; of suits
between two or more Provinces; between one Province and the citizens of an-
other; between the citizens of different Provinces; and between one Province and
its citizens against a foreign State or citizen.
Id. art. 100.
41. Judgment of Oct. 18, 1864, CSJN, 1 Fallos 345, 347 (Arg.); see also Garay, supra
note 33, at 197-98 (arguing that the absence of an Argentine provision similar to the llth
Amendment to the United States Constitution strengthens the Argentine Supreme Court's
position as the final interpreter).
42. Garay, supra note 33, at 185-201. The United States Supreme Court has also re-
jected a strict principle of stare decisis. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2808-09 (1992) (outlining reasons why "the rule of stare decisis is not an 'inexorable com-
mand' "); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557-58 (1985) (accusing
the majority of ignoring the principle of stare decisis) (Powell, J., dissenting). Therefore, any
United States influence will no longer compel strict application of stare decisis.
43. Garay, supra note 33, at 186 (citing JORGE J. LLAMBIAS, 1 TRATADO DE DERECHO
CIVIL; PAnTE GENERAL 79-80 (10th ed.)); see also, Alejandro M. Garro, Eficacia y Autoridad
del Precedente Constitucional en America Latina: Las Lecciones del Derecho Comparado,
20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 473, 474 (1989) (asserting that "[iun order to give firmness
and certainty to the constitutional values enunciated by the highest courts, it is necessary to
establish a solid and compulsory body of case-law or jurisprudencia, formed by a continu-
ous link of cases") (translation of editor). For a discussion of the civil law system see gener-
ally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (2d ed. 1985).
44. Garay, supra note 33, at 190-91.
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stare decisis and its binding effect. 5 Thus, under either the doc-
trine of jurisprudencia or stare decisis, the Argentine Court,
though not strictly bound by its prior decisions, should not disre-
gard precedent without some rational basis.4
The binding effect of Supreme Court opinions on lower courts
is even less definite. 47 Despite the Supreme Court's position as the
final arbiter of the Constitution, lower courts have departed from
precedent by providing justifiable legal grounds." The doctrine of
justifiable legal grounds places all federal courts at the same level
because a lower court can disregard precedent, effectively overrul-
ing it, by providing justifiable legal grounds. This practice is
clearly different from the technique of factually distinguishing pre-
cedent because ignoring precedent on new legal grounds overrules
the precedent, while factually distinguishing precedent helps de-
fine its scope.
This is not to say that the Supreme Court is bound by prece-
dent while the lower courts are not. Rather, the concepts of juris-
prudencia and stare decisis compel all courts to follow precedent
unless there is some rational basis for differing.49 Garay argues that
"[i]f an inferior court can unabashedly question a Supreme Court
decision, the idea of binding precedent becomes academic .. .
[since] [n]ew arguments and support are easy to articulate."5 "
45. Judgment of May 15, 1939 (Baretta v. Provincia de Cordoba), CSJN, 183 Fallos 409
(Arg.).
46. However, Garay observes that, "[iun cases where the Argentine Supreme Court has
decided to move away from controlling precedents, the apparent ground for such deviations
was either a 'new majority on the Court or changing conditions (e.g., legal, social, political,
and economic)." Garay, supra note 33, at 188. Since both conditions have occurred in Ar-
gentina, supra text accompanying notes 8-22, one could have predicted the Court's disre-
gard for precedent in Ekmekdijian v. Sofovich. See infra text accompanying notes 131-55
for a discussion of the Court's treatment of precedent.
47. Garay concludes that "(1) [lower courts are always bound by en banc court of ap-
peals decisions involving questions of ordinary or non-federal law [the civil codes]; (2) how-
ever, lower court judges are not bound by Supreme [Clourt precedents on questions of con-
stitutional law." Garay, supra note 33, at 200. Garay bases his conclusions on cases that
bind lower courts to higher courts' interpretations of the civil codes, and cases that allow
lower courts to ignore constitutional interpretations if the parties present new and justifia-
ble legal grounds for overruling the precedent. Id. at 193-200.
48. See Judgment of July 4, 1985 (CerAmica San Lorenzo), CSJN, 307 Fallos 1094,
1096-97 (Arg.).
49. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
50. Garay, supra note 33, at 197.
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D. The Right of Reply Within Argentina
The Argentine Constitution does not have a provision granting
a right of reply." The Argentine Supreme Court has held that Ar-
ticle 33 of the Constitution, which declares that the rights listed in
the Constitution are not all-encompassing, implies no right of re-
ply.5 The constitutions of most of Argentina's provinces provide
for a right of reply,5" but seem to grant standing only to those per-
sons named or alluded to by the media.'
However, Argentina does have other remedies for those claim-
ing to be slandered by the press. In both civil and penal proceed-
ings, the judge can order the publication of the court's judgment if
doing so would adequately restore the damaged reputations."
These actions, though, might require an entire trial and the judge's
cooperation. The right of reply, in most cases, requires a summary
proceeding that operates without the help of the judiciary, unless
51. See generally Julio Cesar Rivera, El derecho de replica, rectificaci6n o respuesta,
1985-E L.L. 786, 791-92.
52. Judgment of Dec. 1, 1988 (Abelenda v. Ediciones de la Urraca, S.A.), CSJN, 311
Fallos 2553, 2562-64 (Arg.); Judgment of Dec. 1, 1988 (Ekmekdjian v. Neustadt), CSJN, 311
Fallos 2497, 2498-99 (Arg.).
53. Judgment of July 7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich), CSJN, - Fallos _, para. 14
(majority opinion), para. 23 (Petracchi and O'Conner, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (Arg.) (citing Constituci6n de Santiago del Estero art. 20; Constituci6n de Neuquen
art. 22; Constituci6n de La Pampa art. 8; Constituci6n de Formosa art. 12; Constituci6n de
Chubut art. 15; Constituci6n de San Luis art. 21; Constituci6n de Jujuy art. 23; Constituci6n
de Salta art. 23; Constituci6n de San Juan art. 25; Constituci6n de Tierra del Fuego Antar-
tida e Islas del Atlhntico Sur art. 47; Constituci6n de Catamarca art. 15; Constituci6n de Rio
Negro art. 27; Constituci6n de Santa Cruz art. 15; Constituci6n de Santa Fe art. 11). The
Constitution of Buenos Aires does not have a right of reply provision. Several of the provini-
cal provisions are reprinted in Rivera, supra note 51, at 790-91.
54. See Liliana Albornoz, El derecho a replica, rectificaci6n a respuesta y la jerar-
quizaci6n del hombre, 1989-A L.L. 964, 972-74; Rivera, supra note 51, at 790-91. Although
the provincial constitutions seem to grant standing only to those persons named or alluded
to by the media, their language, like that of article 14, is subject to varied interpretation.
Albornoz illustrates the problems created by the use of various words in the right of reply
provisions. For instance, Salta's provision, arguably the most indefinite, allows replies to
offensive or inaccurate information, but requires the suffering of an injury. Albornoz, supra
at 972. Albornoz argues that the phrase "the suffering of an injury" is imprecise and could
include a quantitatively small injury at a future time. Id. Note that the American Conven-
tion's provision uses the same language. American Convention, supra note 3, art. 14(1).
Other provinical constitutions are more definite. The phrase "personal reputation" in
San Luis's constitution suggests that only damage to an individual's public image allows a
right of reply. Rivera, supra note 51, at 790-91. Similarly, La Carta's provision requires a
personal attack on one's reputation, honor, or dignity. Id.
55. C6D. Ctv. art. 1071 his (Arg.); C6D. PEN. art. 114 (Arg.); see also Judgment of Dec.
11, 1972 (Valdez), CSJN, 284 Fallos 345 (Arg.).
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the media is uncooperative."6
Arguably, prosecuting a slanderer or obtaining a right of reply
could require similar proceedings. A slander suit, like the right of
reply, will avoid the courts if the parties settle. Similarly, the right
of reply, like most slander suits, might require a full trial if the
media refuses to grant a reply. Under both causes of action, the
parties may or may not need judicial intervention. Therefore, the
critical factor in choosing the right of reply is likely not its sum-
mary procedure. Rather, the right of reply's most attractive feature
is its reply remedy-a remedy which in not automatic in slander."'
This automatic remedy can be found in article 14(1) of the
American Convention on Human Rights. 58 Article 14(1) provides
that "[a]nyone injured by inaccurate or offensive statements or
ideas5 e disseminated to the public in general by a legally regulated
medium of communication has the right to reply or to make a cor-
rection using the same communication's outlet, under such condi-
tions as the law may establish." 60
Argentina ratified the American Convention on Human Rights
with one reservation and three interpretive statements on Septem-
ber 5, 1984.61 The Convention obliges the State Parties "to ensure
to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise
of those rights and freedoms [recognized by the Convention]."
'
The Convention also demands that "the States Parties undertake
56. See generally Judgment of July 7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich), CSJN, - Fallos
-, para. 31 (majority opinion) (Arg.).
57. See C6D. Civ. art. 1071 bis (Arg.).
58. See American Convention, supra note 3.
59. "The word 'ideas' does not appear in the Spanish, Portuguese or French texts ...
which refer to 'informaciones inexactas 6 agraviantes,' 'informac6es inexatas ou ofensivas'
and to 'donnes inexactes ou des imputations diffamatoires.'" Advisory Opinion OC-7/85,
Enforceability of the Right to Reply or Correction (arts. 14(1) and (2) American Convention
on Human Rights), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., para. 20 n.* (1986) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion].
60. The remainder of article 14 reads:
2. The correction or reply shall not in any case remit other legal liabilities that
may have been incurred.
3. For the effective protection of honor and reputation, every publisher, and
every newspaper, motion picture, radio, and every television company, shall have
a person responsible who is not protected by immunities or special privileges.
American Convention, supra note 3.
61. The National Congress approved the treaty with Ley 23.054, 44-B A.D.L.A. 1250
(1984). Argentina filed the instruments of ratification, a reservation to art. 21, and interpre-
tative statements to art. 5(3), art. 7(7) and art. 10 on September 5, 1984. See Basic Docu-
ments Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/ser. L.V/II.71 doc. 6
rev.1 (1987).
62. American Convention, supra note 3, art. 1(1).
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to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the
provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as
may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms."63
Ekmekdjian's strategy was to argue that article 14 of the
American Convention on Human Rights was Argentine law under
Articles 31 and 33 of the Constitution."4 Specifically, Ekmekdjian
argued that, because Article 31 provided that treaties were the su-
preme law of the land, 5 and Article 33 stated that the rights listed
in the constitution were not all-encompassing,"6 Argentine law
should contain a right of reply. 7
III. THE CASE OF EKMEKDJIAN V. SOFOVICH
Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich presented two key issues:68 (1)
whether article 14 was self-executing, 9 and (2) whether Ekmekd-
jian had standing to reply to the television program's comments on
the relationship between Jesus and the Virgin Mary."0
The Justices divided into four factions. A majority of five
7'
voted affirmatively on both issues.
72  A second group of three73
63. Id. art. 2.
64. Judgment of July 7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich), CSJN, - Fallos - para. 2
(majority opinion) (Arg.).
65. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
67. Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich, pars. 2 (majority opinion).
68. A procedural issue arose concerning whether the lower courts' denial of the right of
reply of article 14 of the American Convention presented a case sufficiently important for
the Court to hear, since appellate review in the Argentine Supreme Court was discretionary.
Judgment of July 7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich), CSJN, - Fallos -, para. 4 (majority
opinion) (Arg.); see also Ley 23.774, 50-B A.D.L.A. 1256-57, art. 2 (Arg.) (1990) (modifying
arts. 280 and 285 of the C6digo Procesal Civil y Commercial to provide for discretion). All
nine Justices agreed that the case presented a federal question of sufficient importance to
hear Ekmekdjian's petition for extraordinary relief. Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich, para. 4 (major-
ity opinion), para. 3 (Petracchi and O'Conner, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), para. 4 (Levene, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part), pars. 3 (Belluscio, J.,
dissenting). The Justices agreed that the Court should hear the case because the lower
courts' decisions possibly infringed on rights granted by clauses of the Constitution and the
American Convention on Human Rights. Id.
69. Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich, para. 3 (majority opinion).
70. Id. at para. 7.
71. JJ. Martinez, Fayt, Barra, Boggiano, and Nazareno.
72. Judgment of July 7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich), CSJN, __ Fallos -, para. 32
(majority opinion) (Arg.).
73. Petracchi, O'Conner, JJ, and Levene, CJ. Justices Petracchi and O'Conner joined in
an opinion, id. at para. 1 (Petracchi and O'Conner, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) while Chief Justice Levene wrote his own. Id. at pars. 1. (Levene, CJ., concurring in
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agreed that article 14 was self-executing,74 but took the position
that Ekmekdjian did not have standing." One Justice disagreed
with the majority's holdings on both issues.
7
1
A. A Self-Executing Right of Reply?
The first issue was whether the right of reply contained in ar-
ticle 14 of the American Convention on Human Rights was self-
executing. 77 Eight of the nine Justices concurred in the conclusion
that it was self-executing. 78 The Court reasoned that implementing
legislation was not necessary because an international human
rights treaty's provisions were operative when (1) the description
of the right was sufficiently concrete, and (2) the right could oper-
ate without implementing legislation. 9
The Court began by affirming the supremacy of international
treaties over Argentine law. It noted that the Vienna Convention
part and dissenting in part).
74. Id. at paras. 17, 19, 24 (Petracchi and O'Conner, JJ., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). Id. at para. 8 (Levene, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. Id. at para. 25 (Petracchi and O'Conner, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Id. at paras. 21, 22 (Levene, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. Id. at pares. 4-6 (Belluscio, J., dissenting).
77. Judgment of July 7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich), CSJN, - Fallos -, para. 1
(majority opinion) (Arg.).
78. Id. at para. 32 (majority opinion), pares. 17, 19, 24 (Petracchi and O'Conner, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), para. 8 (Levene, CJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
79. Id. at para. 20 (majority opinion). Justices Petracchi and O'Connor's separate opin-
ion concurred with the majority. They stressed that article 14 of the American Convention
is part of a human rights treaty, which is inherently different from other treaties because it
deals with the relationship between people and their states rather than the reciprocal equi-
librium between states. Id. at para. 14 (Petracchi and O'Connor, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
Chief Justice Levene's separate opinion also concurred on the right of reply's self-exe-
cuting nature. Id. at pares. 8, 9 (Levene, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He
discussed the power of the Argentine Supreme Court to exercise its quasi-legislative func-
tion in setting the parameters of the right of reply. Id. at pares. 10, 14. The Supreme Court
of Argentina, according to the Chief Justice, had an implicit power emanating from the
Constitution to recognize the existence of human rights and to establish their operation. Id.
at para. 12. The failure of the national legislature to enact any legislation could not impede
judicial compliance with its mandate of protecting human rights. Id. at para. 15. Therefore,
the absence of implementing legislation was irrelevant, and the judiciary had the power to
implement the right of reply itself. Id.
Justice Belluscio, in dissent, cited Argentine Supreme Court cases, see discussion infra
text accompanying notes 124-130, which held the right of reply inoperative without enabling
legislation. Id. at para. 4 (Belluscio, J., dissenting). He also asserted that the Court's actions
were the equivalent of legislating-an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers. Id.
at paras. 5, 6.
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on the Law of Treaties"0 altered the internal legal system of Argen-
tina by establishing the supremacy of international law over any
conflicts with Argentine law.81 Therefore, an operative treaty obli-
gation, where it conflicted with Argentine law, would prevail. A
conflict could occur, according to the Court, either because estab-
lished internal laws were contrary to a treaty provision or because
establishing measures fulfilling a treaty obligation were ommit-
ted.82 In Ekmekdjian's case, the federal government of Argentina
had not installed article 14(1) of the American Convention into Ar-
gentine law. es
In deciding that article 14(1) was self-executing and thus oper-
ative, the Court relied heavily on the grammar of article 14(1) and
on an advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights." The Argentine Court asserted that a textual interpreta-
tion of the phrase "has the right to reply" in article 14(1)
"clear[ed] the doubt over the existence of the alleged self-execu-
tion."8 The phrasing of the right of reply in the present tense,
according to the Court, suggested an operative provision that did
not require implementing legislation.
However, article 14(1) ends with the-phrase "under such con-
ditions as the law may establish.""" The Argentine Supreme Court
referred to an advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights to determine the meaning of this phrase.8e The In-
ter-American Court stated "the Convention guarantee[d] a right of
reply or correction"88 and interpreted the last phrase of article
14(1) to refer to procedural matters such as the space allowed in
80. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Argentina's Congress approved the Convention in 1972. Ley 19.865, 32-D
A.D.L.A. 6412 (1972).
81. Judgment of July 7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich), CSJN, - Fallos _, paras. 17-
19 (majority opinion) (Arg.).
82. Id. at para. 16. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated that, "[ijf
for any reason, therefore, the right of reply or correction could not be exercised by 'anyone'
who is subject to the jurisdiction of a State Party.. ." that country would be in violation of
the Convention. Advisory Opinion, supra note 59, at para. 28.
83. Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich, at para. 19 (majority opinion).
84. Advisory Opinion, supra note 59.
85. Judgment of July 7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich), CSJN, - Fallos -, para. 20
(majority opinion) (Arg.). The Court stated: "La interpretaci6n textual segin la cul toda
persona 'tiene derecho a . . .' despeja la duda sobre la existencia de la alegada
operatividad."
86. See American Convention, supra note 3, art. 14(l).
87. Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich, at para. 21 (majority opinion).
88. Advisory Opinion, supra note 59, at para. 26.
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the reply, permissible words, and when the response must be pub-
lished." Relying on the advisory opinion, the Argentine Supreme
Court determined that the ending phrase of article 14(1) did not
require legislative action to create the right of reply, but merely
allowed each countries' internal legal system the opportunity to
determine its parameters."'
The Argentine Supreme Court concluded that the legislature
was not the only body that could determine the right of reply's
parameters.91 The Court cited the American Convention for the
notion that "States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with
their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Conven-
tion, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give
effect to those rights or freedoms."92 The Court pointed to the
phrase "other measures" as authorizing constitutional bodies other
than the legislature to define parameters to the right of reply.'3
The Inter-American Court on Human Rights Advisory Opinion
also supported the view that the Word "measures" refered to the
domestic legal system in general, and not just the legislature.'4
The Argentine Court bolstered its conclusion that the legisla-
ture was not the only body that could determine the right of re-
ply's parameters with a plain reading of article 14(1). The Court
cited the clause "under such conditions as the law may establish" 9
and concluded that the Argentine Supreme Court makes law in Ar-
gentina.'6 Therefore the Supreme Court could determine the pa-
rameters of the right of reply in order to stop Argentina's violation
of the Convention.
B. Standing if the Press Offends One's Beliefs?
The second issue was whether Ekmekdjian had standing to re-
ply to the television program's comments on the relationship be-
tween Jesus and the Virgin Mary." The Justices, voting 5:4,
89. Id. at para. 27.
90. Judgment of July 7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich), CSJN, - Fallos -, para. 22
(majority opinion) (Arg.).
91. Id. at para. 22.
92. American Convention, supra note 3, art. 2 (emphasis added).
93. Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich, at para. 22 (majority opinion).
94. Advisory Opinion, supra note 59, at para. 33.
95. American Convention, supra note 3, art. 14(1) (emphasis added).
96. Judgment of July 7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich), CSJN, __ Fallos -, para. 22
(majority opinion) (Arg.).
97. Id. at para. 24 (majority opinion) (Arg.).
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granted Ekmekdjian standing.98  The majority distinguished
Ekmekdjian v. Neustadt99 where Ekmekdjian attempted to reply
to a statement of former President Frondizi. 100 The majority rea-
soned that, in the instant case, Ekmekdjian was a fervent catholic
whose convictions on the virtue of Jesus and the Virgin Mary were
extremely hurt.'' The majority explained that issues of public
opinion do not grant standing "except with an offense of religious
sentiments of a person who has been affected most profoundly. '"102
Reinforcing this offended-religious-belief test, the majority re-
ferred to foreign media guidelines on religion. 03 It asserted that
the College of Television of the United States, the National Associ-
ation of Radiobroadcasters, and the Filmmakers Association of
America granted special protection to religion by publishing codes
of behavior barring certain attacks on religion. 04
The four Justices who dissented on this issue were concerned
that a broad right of reply would destroy freedom of the press.0 6
Thus, Justices Petracchi and O'Conner wished to limit the right of
reply to those persons that the press directly described or alluded
to in an inaccurate and offensive manner.108 Their opinion relied
on the laws of other countries which only allowed rights of reply to
persons named or alluded to in the press. 107 The Justices also
98. Id. at para. 24 (majority opinion), paras. 25, 26 (Petracchi and O'Conner, JJ., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part), paras. 21, 22 (Levene, CJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (author's translation), paras. 5, 6 (Belluscio, J., dissenting). In Spanish,
"de una persona que se ha sentido mortificada en sus sentimientos mAs profundos par
expresiones insitamente agraviantes para su sistema de creencias . Id. at para. 25
(majority opinion).
99. Judgment of Dec. 1, 1988 (Ekmekdjian v. Neustadt), CSJN, 311 Fallos 2497 (Arg.).
100. Id. at 2497.
101. Judgment of July 7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich), CSJN, - Fallos _., para. 26
(majority opinion) (Arg.) (author's translation). In Spanish, "en su cardcter de catblico mili-
tante, se sinti6 agraviado en lo profundo de su personalidad y de sus convicciones por las
expresiones vertidas sobre Jesucristo y la Virgen Maria ......
102. Id. (author's translation). In Spanish: "No se trata pues de una cuesti6n vincu-
lada con juicios pblicos sobre materias controvertibles propias de las opiniones, sino de la
ofensa a los sentimientos religiosos de una persona que afectan lo ms profundo de su
personalidad por su conexi6n con su sistema de creencias."
103. Id. at para. 30 (majority opinion).
104. Id.
105. Id. at para. 25 (Petracchi and O'Conner, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), paras. 21, 22 (Levene, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part), para. 6 (Bellus-
cio, J., dissenting).
106. Judgment of July 7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich), CSJN, __ Fallos -, para. 24
(Petracchi and O'Conner, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Arg.).
107. Id. at paras. 21, 22 (Petracchi and O'Conner, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citing France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Peru, Brazil, and Uruguay).
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listed the rights of reply available in the provinces of Argentina
that required the person to be named by the press. 108 They ex-
plained that the majority's opinion would allow a person to use the
right of reply to refute attacks on one's beliefs by merely proving
one's adherence to those beliefs.'0 9 They worried that the major-
ity's opinion would cause an inevitable loss to the press because
the press would have to publish every adverse opinion, resulting
"in the absurd position that the media will only be able to publish
freely when they have the financial capability to pay for all even-
tual contradictions. '" 1 0 Justices Petracchi and O'Conner closed
with a critique: "Economically impracticable, and logically incoher-
ent, this important holding clearly reduces the right of freedom of
expression. The reality refutes utopia: there will not be many
voices, there will be silence."''
Chief Justice Levene also disagreed with the majority's broad
definition of standing. He explained that injuries to ideological, po-
litical, and religious beliefs were personal rather than societal and
so escaped the protection of the right of reply." 2 The majority's
broad language "would grant the right of reply ... such an exten-
sive interpretation as to make it judicially undefinable so that it
would collide with the hallowed principles of freedom of the press
found in our National Constitution."'' 3
108. Id. at para. 23 (Petracchi and O'Conner, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The province of Buenos Aires does not provide for a right of reply, which was one
reason Ekmekdjian did not sue in the provincial court. The other was that he would not
have standing under the laws of the provinces. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
109. Id. at para. 25 (Petracchi and O'Conner, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
110. Judgment of July 7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich), CSJN, - Fallos -, para. 25
(Petracchi and O'Conner, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Arg.) (author's
translation). In Spanish: "Por el contrario, si se obilgara a los medios a costear toda opin-
i6n adversa a Io que had difundido, se llegaria rapidamente al absurdo de que s~lo seria
posible expresarse libremente a travs de aqugllos, a condici6n de poder financiar igual
posibilidad a todos los eventuales contradictores."
111. Id. at para. 25 (Petracchi and O'Conner, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (author's translation). In Spanish: "Impracticable economicamente e incoherente del
punto de vista i6gico, tal pretensi6n importaria un claro menoscabo al derecho de libre
expresibn. La realidad desmentiria a La utopia: no habria muchas voces, habria silencio."
112. Id. at para. 21 (Levene, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113. Id. at para. 22 (Levene, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (author's
translation). In Spanish: "Que a La luz de lo expuesto ha de concluirse en la falta de legi-
timaci6n del actor para interponer la presente demanda, pues extender el derecho de r~p-
lica al campo de las opiniones, criticas o ideas, importaria una interpretacibn extensiva
del mismo que Lo haria juridicamente indefinible y colisionaria con los principios sobre
libertad de prensa consagrados en nuestra Constituci6n Nacional."
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Justice Belluscio dissented from the view that article 14 was
self-executing, thus not reaching the issue of standing.11 4 However,
he still commented that the majority's broad interpretation of
standing was unfounded and would destroy freedom of the press. 5
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Background
An analysis of the current Argentine political climate, the Ar-
gentine judicial system, and the Court's opinion in Ekmekdjian v.
Sofovich reveals a Court whose role as a human rights implementer
is unlikely.
As previously discussed, President Menem not only pardoned
many human rights violators, but also ousted those responsible for
the violators' prosecution." 6 His agenda is not one of human rights
improvement, but economics.117 The Argentine Supreme Court,
whose support was crucial to the violators' prosecution,118 is now a
completely different court, packed by Menem. Recent Supreme
Court decisions 9 suggest that the change in composition means an
equally significant change in jurisprudence. Its prior agenda, as a
supporter of human rights, is unlikely to continue.
While the Court implemented a provision of a human rights
treaty in Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich, Argentina's political climate
casts a pallor of self-dealing over the opinion. The political envi-
ronment includes hostility between President Menem and the Ar-
gentine press 20 and a court-packing plan by Menem.' In this
context, an opinion implementing the right of reply suggests a po-
litical blow against the press by Menem and his Court, rather than
firm legal precedent for human rights activists.
Furthermore, the absence of a rigid scheme of stare decisis in
the Argentine legal system will likely prevent the Argentine Su-
preme Court from becoming an implementer of human rights. In
order for courts to make law, their opinions must be binding in
114. Id. at para. 5 (Beliuscio, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at para. 6.
116. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
117. See generally Free Markets, supra note 30, at 5.
118. See Alfonsin, supra note 16, at 42-46, 49-52.
119. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 8-21 and accompanying text.
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cases with similar facts, or their opinions merely adjudicate claims
between two adversaries. The Argentine judiciary has struggled
with the binding effect of Supreme Court precedent on the Su-
preme and lower courts.12 Under the current system, any court
can depart from Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich by providing justifiable
legal grounds.' Simply because this Court granted Ekmekdjian a
right of reply, other courts are not required to award a reply to
future plaintiffs with similar facts. Under this chaotic system, no
Argentine Court can set precedent guaranteeing human rights.
Furthermore, even if other Argentine courts acknowledge that
article 14(1) is operative within Argentina, these courts could se-
lect different rules for standing. Because any Argentine court can
ignore Supreme Court precedent by providing justifiable legal
grounds,"' the Supreme Court's parameters for the exercise of a
right of reply are not obligatory.
B. The Case
The Court's reasoning suggests a limited role for the Court in
the human rights area. Although it found article 14 self-executing,
the Court specifically limited its role as an implementer to specific
types of treaty provisions. First, the Court reasoned that a treaty
obligation, if operative, prevailed over internal Argentine law.12 5
Therefore, only operative treaty provisions could be considered,
eliminating any possibility of customary international law
implementation.
Second, the Court reasoned that a treaty provision was opera-
tive when adopted through legislation or when the description .of
the right was sufficiently concrete. 2 Therefore, according to the
Court's reasoning, only strictly defined political rights that a court
could enforce and oversee without legislative assistance qualified
for possible implementation. 27 If the Court was only willing to im-
plement political rights, it eliminated judicial implementation of
122. See supra notes 33-50 and accompanying text.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Judgment of July 7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich), CSJN, - Fallos . paras. 17-
20 (majority opinion) (Arg.).
126. Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich, at para. 20 (majority opinion).
127. See Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich, at paras. 14, 15 (Petracchi and O'Conner, JJ., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (presuming that economic, social, and cultural rights are
goals, not rights).
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economic, social, and cultural rights.
12 8
Except for distinguishing between the implementation of po-
litical versus other rights, the Court's reasoning is rational because
the provisions of treaties ratified by countries without qualification
should become the internal law of those countries. 12  This is espe-
cially true in Argentina and the United States where both Consti-
tutions make treaties the supreme law of the land."' However, the
argument has not worked in the United States because of reluc-
tance to unequivocally ratify human rights conventions.13 ' The Ar-
gentine Supreme Court, nevertheless, recognized that the right of
reply, as part of a ratified treaty, should be operative as internal
law.
1. A Self-Executing Right of Reply?
While the Court seems correct in holding that the right of re-
ply was operative, the Court, if correct, was correct for the wrong
reasons. The first error was their disregard of prior precedent. The
second was their erroneous reliance on an advisory opinion of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
The term, "self-executing," is divided into two concepts: do-
mestic validity and domestic applicability. 132 Domestic validity is
128. For an in depth discussion of the implementation of civil and political versus eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights, see Rhoda Howard, The Full Belly Thesis: Should Eco-
nomic Rights Take Priority Over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan
Africa, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 467 (1983).
129. See generally Susansa Albanese, Operatividad y programaticidad de las cldusulas
de los tratados internacionales, 1987-C L.L. 974 (a review of recent Argentine case law on
self-execution); Juan Antonio Travieso, La recepci6n de la convenci6n americana de der-
echos humanos en el sistema juridico argentino, 1987-C L.L. 645 (discussing the force and
applicability of the American Convention on Human Rights within Argentina). But see
Jorge Bustamante Alsina, El derecho de r~plica debe ser reglamentado solamente por Con-
greso de La Naci6n, 1986-C L.L. 798.
130. See supra notes 33-63 and accompanying text.
131. See generally NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SEN-
ATE: A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION (1990); David Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the
Human Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L. REV. 35 (1978).
132. See Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States:
a Critical Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 627, 632 (1986); Travieso, supra note 130, at 646-47
(discussing the force and applicability of the American Convention on Human Rights within
Argentina). Many Argentine scholars have written on the whether article 14 is self-execut-
ing. See generally Liliana Albornoz, supra note 54, at 964; Jorge Bustamante Alsina, supra
note 129, at 978; Miguel Angel Ekmekdjian, Los casos "Birt" y "Sanchez Abelenda," a pro-
p6sito de la integraci6n humanitaria latinoamrica, 1990-B L.L. 1024.
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the force of law a treaty has within a country,3 ' while domestic
applicability refers to whether a treaty is operative within a coun-
try."" The Argentine Supreme Court stated that the American
Convention on Human Rights was in force within Argentina be-
cause ratified treaties were the supreme law of the land under Arti-
cle 31 of the Argentine Constitution.13 G Therefore, domestic valid-
ity of the American Convention on Human Rights was not
disputed in Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich.5 6
However, the Court departed from precedent on the issue of
domestic applicability. 13 7 Previous Argentine Supreme Court cases
held that article 14(1) needed implementing legislation. 138 In
Abelenda v. Ediciones de la Urraca, S.A.,1'" a man whose name
was published in a list of conspirators by the defendant newspaper
sued to enforce his right of reply after the Minister of the Interior
and a criminal court found him uninvolved.4 0 The justices denied
him relief holding that article 14(1) was neither implied in Article
33 of the Argentine Constitution nor self-executing.1 41 Abelenda
presented a more compelling case than Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich
because the newspaper listed Abelenda as a conspirator when he
133. Iwasawa, supra note 132, at 632 n.26.
134. Domestic applicability means that a provision is "'capable of being applied with-
out the need for further measures.'" Id. at 632, n.27; see also Albanese, supra note 129, at
974-78 (reviewing recent Argentine case law on self-execution); Travieso, supra note 129, at
646 (discussing the force and applicability on the American Convention on Human Rights
within Argentina).
135. Judgment of July 7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich), CSJN, - Fallos _, pare. 2
(majority opinion) (Arg.).
136. Commentators agree that treaties have domestic validity. See, e.g., Albanese,
supra note 129, at 975. "In the United States, for example, the Constitution recognizes that
treaties are 'the supreme Law of the Land.' .... Thus, ratified treaties have domestic valid-
ity in the United States." Iwasawa, supra note 132, at 632 n.26.
137. Several Argentine commentators wrote articles criticizing the Court's prior opin-
ions. They argued that article 14 was self-executing. See, e.g., Albornoz, supra note 54, at
964; Ekmekdjian, supra note 132, at 1024.
138. Judgment of Dec. 1, 1988 (Abelenda v. Ediciones de la Urraca, S.A.), CSJN, 311
Fallos 2553 (Arg.); Judgment of Dec. 1, 1988 (Ekmekdjian v. Neustadt), CSJN, 311 Fallos
2497 (Arg.); Judgment of May 12, 1987 (Costa v. Ciudad de Buenos Aires), CSJN, 310 Fallos
510 (1987) (Arg.); Judgment of May 15, 1986 (Campillay v. La Raz6n), CSJN, 308 Fallos 789
(Arg.). For the self-execution of other provisions see, Judgment of June 9, 1987, CSJN,
1987-D L.L. 335 (Arg.) (holding that article 17(5) of the American Convention dealing with
equal rights for children born out of wedlock only became operational when Congress passed
a law implementing the provision).
139. Judgment of Dec. 1, 1988 (Abelenda v. Ediciones de la Urraca, S.A.), CSJN, 311
Fallos 2553 (Arg.).
140. Id. at para. 2.
141. Id. at para. 4.
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was not.142 The newspaper damaged Abelenda's personal reputa-
tion that could have been restored by a reply. In contrast to
Abelenda, the television program in Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich did
not name or allude to Ekmekdjian. Instead, Ekmekdjian com-
plained because the press allegedly attacked his religious beliefs.
Similarly, in Ekmekdjian v. Neustadt"3' the justices refused a
television viewer the right of reply to comments made by former
Argentine President Arturo Frondzi (1958-62).' 4" The majority in
Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich distinguished Ekmekdjian v. Neustadt by
explaining that Ekmekdjian's character as a fervent catholic was
extremely offended in Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich, while Ekmekdjian
merely tried to reply to the opinions of former President Frondizi
in Ekmekdjian v. Neustadt."5 Most remarkably, the majority in
Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich expressly stated that "in its actual compo-
sition this court does not share the cited precedents, which means
that they are solely formal analogies with the present case.'",6
Such an explanation reveals little regard for precedent because the
Court did not even provide justifiable legal grounds for ignoring
the prior cases.""
The second error of the Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich majority was
its erroneous reliance on an advisory opinion of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights. In the advisory opinion, Costa Rica asked
the Inter-American Court whether Costa Rica had guaranteed arti-
cle 14's right of reply to all persons within its jurisdiction by ratify-
ing the American Convention on Human Rights.'48 The Inter-
American Court replied "that the question... contain[ed] two dif-
ferent issues which [were] clearly distinguishable."'' 9
The first issue concerned the validity of article 14 within Costa
Rica.150 The Inter-American Court accepted jurisdiction over this
142. Id. at para. 2.
143. Judgment of Dec. 1, 1988 (Ekmekdjian v. Neustadt), CSJN 311 Fallos 2497 (Arg.).
144. Id. at 2499-500.
145. Judgment of July 7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich), CSJN, - Fallos -, para. 26
(majority opinion) (Arg.).
146. Id. (author's translation). In Spanish: "en su actual composici6n este Tribunal no
comparte los precedentes citados, resulta c2til sefialar que aqu~llos guardan s6lo analogla
formal con el presente."
147. The Court could not say that it was distinguishing the prior cases on their facts
because Abelenda's facts presented a better case for a right of reply. See supra note 140 and
accompanying text.
148. Advisory Opinion, supra note 59, at para. 13.
149. Id. at para. 14.
150. Id.
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question because it "concerns the interpretation of article 14(1) of
the Convention in relation to article 1(1) .. . ."I"' Article 1 obli-
gated the countries to respect the rights granted by the Conven-
tion. 15 Therefore, the Inter-American Court concluded that Costa
Rica had guaranteed or given force of law (validity) to the right of
reply.15 The domestic validity of the right of reply was not dis-
puted in Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich."'
The second issue concerned the application of article 14 to the
internal legal system of Costa Rica.' " The Inter-American Court
refused to address the issue of domestic applicability because
"[t]he second issue . . . [fell] outside the advisory jurisdiction of
the Court."' 6 Therefore, the Argentine Supreme Court relied on
an opinion that confronted the issue of domestic validity rather
than domestic applicability to sustain the proposition that article
14 was domestically applicable.
2. Menem's Influence
This case demonstrates Menem's influence over the Argentine
Supreme Court. The Argentine Supreme Court had five Justices
when Menem took office in 1989.'"7 Two Justices left the Argentine
Supreme Court before 1990."5' Two Justices from the Abelenda
and Ekmekdjianv. Neustadt cases remained on the Argentine Su-
preme Court. One of those two Justices voted that article 14(1) was
self-executing in Ekemekdjian v. Sofovich, while one voted that it
was not.159 Another Justice, who said that article 14(1) was self-
executing,'6" also remained on the Supreme Court and voted for
self-execution with the Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich majority. Most no-
151. Id.
152. See supra text accompanying note 62.
153. Advisory Opinion, supra note 59, at paras. 26, 30.
154. See supra notes 134-36 and accompar~ying text.
155. Advisory Opinion, supra note 59, at par. 14.
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 8-21 and accompanying text.
158. The two Justices were Jorge A. Bacqu6 and Jos6 S. Caballero. See MIU.ER, supra
note 17, at 1797.
159. Justice Petracchi voted that article 14 was self-executing while Justice Belluscio
voted that it was not.
160. See Judgment of May 15, 1986 (Campillay v. La Raz6n), CSJN, 308 Fallos 789
(Arg.) (dissent of Fayt para. 6 states that the right of reply is self-executing). For a discus-
sion of the Campillay case see Atilio Anibal Alternini & Anibal Filippini, Responsibilidad
civil derivada de la difusibn de noticias inexactas: acto ilcito o acto abusivo, 1986-C L.L.
406; Miguel Ekmekdjian, El derecho a la dignidad y La libertad de prensa, 1986-C L.L. 981.
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tably, Menem's six appointees all voted for holding article 14(1)
self-executing."16
3. The Standing Problem
While the Court's decision concerning the right of reply's op-
erative status seems correct, its grant of standing to Ekmekdjian
was without legal foundation.
The majority asserted that most South American countries
had internal rights of reply.1 However, the dissenters responded
that these internal rights of reply would not grant standing to
Ekmekdjian.163 In Brazil, rights of reply have been granted to per-
sons accused and offended by the media."6 4 The Chilean code has
restricted the right to those alluded to by the media. ' The Uru-
guayan code has given the right to those named or alluded to by
the press.1 66 Therefore, the majority should not have relied on any
of these laws as support for the proposition that a statement offen-
sive to one's religious beliefs granted standing.
The majority also cited rights of replies found in the regional
constitutions of Argentina.1 6 7 Again, the dissent replied that
Ekmekdjian would not be granted standing under these constitu-
tions because he was not named or alluded to in the television
program.
16 8
The majority's citation to the publishing codes of the media in
the United States 6 " was also without merit. These codes are self-
161. Compare MMLER, supra note 17, at 1797 (listing the new Justices) with Judgment
of July 7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich), CSJN, - Fallos -, para. 32 (majority opinion)
(Arg.) (listing the Justices in the majority).
162. Judgment of July 7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich), CSJN, - Fallos -, para. 13
(majority opinion) (Arg.) (citing Uruguay (art. 7 of law 16.099), Chile (law 15.476), Brazil
(art. 29 of law 5250-Feb. 9, 1967)).
163. Id. at para. 27 (Petracchi and O'Connor, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
164. Id. at para. 27 (Petracchi and O'Connor, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing art. 29, law 5250, Feb. 9, 1967 (Braz.)).
165. Id. at para. 27 (Petracchi and O'Connor, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing art. 8, law 15.476, 1964 (Chile)).
166. Id. at para. 27 (Petracchi and O'Connor, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing art. 7, law 15.672, 1984 (Uru.)).
167. Judgment of July 7, 1992 (Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich), CSJN, - Fallos -, para. 14
(majority opinion) (Arg.).
168. Id. at para. 28 (Petracchi and O'Connor, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
169. See supra text accompanying note 104.
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regulating standards, not laws of the United States. Therefore, the
majority cited existing rights of reply to strengthen the proposition
that Argentina requires one, but ignored the text of the same laws
when granting standing to Ekmekdjian.
Instead of relying on legal sources, the Court wrote fervently
about the plight of the common person in the modern era of con-
glomerates. 17 0 The common person, the Court observed, does not
have the technological and financial resources to shape public
opinion via journalism. 1 The Court lamented that "an unjust dis-
tribution of the social powers demands to be corrected by reasona-





While the Argentine Supreme Court in Ekmekdjian v.
Sofovich has incorporated a provision of a human rights treaty into
Argentine law, the climate is not favorable for the Court to repeat
its efforts. Commentators justifiably suspect the Court of comply-
ing with Menem's political agenda17 1 which excludes the improve-
ment of human rights. Also, due to Menem's antagonism toward
the press, the Court's opinion can be characterized as a political
blow against the press, rather than a human rights case.
The Argentine doctrine on precedent is another obstacle to ju-
dicial implementation of other human rights in Argentina. Since
the Argentine legal system allows a second court to disregard pre-
cedent with similar facts, where the second court can provide justi-
fiable legal grounds, the Argentine Supreme Court cannot imple-
ment human rights law unless all other courts agree. However, this
lack of law-making power by the Supreme Court could be encour-
aging to human rights activists who may not want a packed court
deciding the future of human rights in Argentina.
Although some human rights organizations could see a Su-
preme Court implementing rights guaranteed by treaties as long-
170. Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich, at paras. 7-12.
171. Id. at para. 8.
172. Id. at para. 8 (author's translation). In Spanish: "Se manifesto asi un injusto
reparto de los poderes sociales que exige ser corregido a travks de mecanismos razonables y
apropriados."
173. See Carl Honore, Argentine High Court's Prestige Tattered by Scandals, MIMU
HERALD, Oct. 11, 1993, at A9. Honore reports "[a]t different times, a cloud of impropriety
has hung over every judge on the [Supreme Court]." Id.
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overdue progress for human rights, Ekemekdjian v. Sofovich does
not signal the beginning of such a trend in Argentina.
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